Reply to: Broad definitions of enforcement are unhelpful for understanding evolutionary mechanisms of cooperation. by Ågren, J Arvid et al.
1 
Reply to: Broad definitions of enforcement are unhelpful for understanding evolutionary 
mechanisms of cooperation. 
J. Arvid Ågren1,*, Nicholas G. Davies2,*, and Kevin R. Foster3,Y 
1 Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University 
arvid_agren@fas.harvard.edu 
2 Department of Infectious Disease Epidemiology, London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine 
nicholas.davies@lshtm.ac.uk 
3 Department of Zoology and Department of Biochemistry, University of Oxford 
kevin.foster@zoo.ox.ac.uk 
* These authors contributed equally 
Y To whom correspondence should be addressed 
 
  
 
 
 
  
2 
While Engelhardt and Taborsky1 agree with the core argument of our recent article2—that 
enforcement is central to the evolution of cooperation—they go on to suggest i) that our use of 
the word “enforcement” is semantically problematic and ii) that we neglect to distinguish 
between behavioural manipulations that occur via helping or harming. We find no merit in these 
points.  
 
First, semantics. Englehardt and Taborsky object that our use of ‘enforcement’ does not 
correspond exactly with their everyday use of the word. The fit between common parlance and 
the terminology of evolutionary biology is an old concern3, but one that can be mitigated by 
clearly defining terms4. Our definition of enforcement—an action that evolves, at least in part, to 
reduce selfish behaviour within a cooperative alliance—reflects the established usage for 
describing mechanisms like partner choice, punishment, and reward in cooperative systems 
across all scales of life (e.g. see Figure 2 in West et al. 20065). Moreover, it was precisely 
because of the subjectivity of language that we also provided an extensive theory supplement 
that defines enforcement mathematically (see also Box 1 in our original piece2). Instead, 
Englehardt and Taborsky provided an “everyday-language” definition of enforcement—“an 
action involving manipulation by force to the benefit of an actor at the expense of a receiver”—
that is so vague that it would draw in examples of both predation and parasitism. This illustrates 
why everyday-language definitions are often insufficient for evolutionary biology.  
 
The second key point of Engelhardt and Taborsky is that we do not sufficiently distinguish 
between the promotion of cooperation through harm and through the provision of incentives or 
help. Again, we disagree. Our review explicitly distinguished between harming and helping 
mechanisms of enforcement (Table 1 in our original piece2) and gave numerous examples of 
each. We also reject their point that manipulation by harming versus helping are so different that 
distinguishing them is “essential”. Consider, for example, a host controlling its microbial 
symbionts either by differential harming or differential feeding, as is thought to occur in the 
mammalian microbiome via various antimicrobial peptides and glycosylated mucins 
respectively6. To increase the relative abundance of a beneficial symbiont, the host can 
preferentially feed cooperative symbionts, preferentially intoxicate non-cooperative symbionts, 
or both. But, importantly, the different mechanisms can have exactly the same evolutionary 
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effects on cooperation. Therefore, while we appreciate that harming and helping mechanisms of 
enforcement can have their differences2, they have a lot more in common to the extent that they 
will be sometimes indistinguishable in their effects on cooperative evolution.  
 
The utility of our framework2 becomes clear when one looks beyond Englehardt and Taborsky’s 
focus on the animal behaviour literature. One of the major advances in evolutionary biology of 
recent decades is the recognition that the principles of social evolution apply equally to selfish 
genetic elements, microbes, mutualisms, and societies7. Restricting focus to animal behaviour1 
prevents one from recognizing the shared principles and establishing the common vocabulary 
needed to understand the evolution of cooperation across all biological systems.  
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